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Secession and Nullification in the Twenty-First
Century
Mark E. Brandon*
As he always does, Professor Sanford Levinson asks
hard questions. In answering those questions, he is engaging,
he is thoughtful, he is learned. And he is not afraid of hard
solutions. I am at something of a disadvantage in offering
critical commentary because I substantially agree with much
of his analysis and with several of his conclusions. So at the
risk of inadequate and inelegant redundancy, I will offer
observations on four fronts: (1) the United States Supreme
Court's claim to judicial supremacy in Cooper v. Aaron;' (2)
the current condition of American constitutional law and
politics; (3) the constitutionality of nullification; and (4) the
constitutionality of secession.
I. COOPER REVISITED
I begin with the inspiration for this Symposium: the
Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v. Aaron, which, in
1958, famously ordered the immediate desegregation of
Little Rock's public schools.2 I have no doubt that the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education'
was correct as a matter of political morality and as a matter
of substantive constitutional law. Nor do I doubt that the
Supreme Court's decision in Cooper was correct,
notwithstanding the enormous challenges that the school
board faced in carrying out the order.
I disagree, however, with aspects of the Court's
syllogism in Cooper. That syllogism runs something like this:
* Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University Law
School.
1. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
2. Id. at 4.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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* Major premise: The Constitution is the
supreme law of the land.4
* Minor premise: Interpreting the
Constitution is the duty of the federal
judiciary.
* Inference from minor premise: The federal
judiciary is the supreme expositor of the law
of the Constitution.6
* Conclusion: The Supreme Court's decisions
are the supreme law of the land.'
In my view, the Court stumbles in its inference from the
minor premise, which leads to a faulty conclusion.
To say this, again, is not to challenge Cooper's
substantive holding. My view merely challenges the
expansive notion of judicial supremacy that the Court
deploys to bolster its authority. Other institutions do have
authority to interpret the Constitution,' and in some
circumstances, their interpretations will be the final and
effectively supreme interpretation. 9  In some other
circumstances, non-judicial institutions may well have at
their disposal the proper political and legal means to resist
policies or decisions of even a federal court, or to get those
policies or decisions reversed. 10 This view was certainly
4. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 ("[T]he interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land....").
5. Id. ("'It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is."' (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803))).
6. Id. (explaining that the Court's decision in Marbury "declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution").
7. Id. at 19-20 ("The principles announced in [Brown] and the obedience of the
States to them, according to the command of the Constitution, are indispensable for
the protection of the freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us.").
8. See, e.g., David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in
Comparative Constitutional Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 319, 325-26 (2010) ("[T]here is
and always has been a vibrant culture of constitutional interpretation outside the
courts in the United States, both within elected institutions and outside them.").
9. See id. ("[H]istorically the legislature and the executive have settled many
issues of constitutional law without the help of the courts.").
10. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1227, 1240 (2008) (discussing President Lincoln's view that "the
Court's authority to interpret the law [is] not . .. exclusive and supreme in the sense
that no other political authority legitimately could contest it").
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Abraham Lincoln's position on the Supreme Court's
infamous decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford." And this
position was part of the strategy of Franklin Roosevelt (and
others) to resist the Court's decisions striking down
enactments of Congress (often on the ground that Congress
was invading the province of states) and enactments of state
legislatures (on the ground that such legislation violated the
freedom of contract and a substantive liberty in due
process).1 2 Quite simply, the New Deal Congress continued
enacting laws despite what the Supreme Court said, and
eventually the Court conceded the doctrinal turf.13
Even states may have tools for resistance. But are
nullification and secession proper political or legal means for
states to resist the reach of a federal law or decision with
which they disagree?
II. MOTIVES
Depending on one's point of view, people today might
have any number of motives for wanting either to nullify or
secede. Consider just a few of the cleavages that have arisen
around issues of policy:
* Same-sex marriage: Some fret that marriage
is gradually being nationalized, while others
complain that it is not yet fully protected
constitutionally.14
* Abortion: Some complain that abortion is
constitutionally protected while the rights of
fetuses are ignored, and others worry that
11. See generally id. at 1231-43 (discussing Lincoln's position on the decision).
12. For a discussion on Roosevelt's relationship with the Court regarding the
New Deal, see generally Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 237, 242-50 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE
SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT (1995)).
13. See id. at 248.
14. See generally MARK E. BRANDON, STATES OF UNION: FAMILY AND
CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 240-273 (2013) (assessing the
constitutional debates over same-sex marriage); Sonia Bychkov Green, Currency of
Love: Customary International Law and the Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in the
United States, 14 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 53, 62-76 (2011) (providing background
on the same-sex-marriage debate and the various statutory approaches taken by
federal and state legislatures).
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the right to terminate a pregnancy is slowly
being eroded."
* Taxation: Some -especially those who want
to "strangle the beast" of government-
complain that the level of taxation is
extravagant, while others are worried that
the rate of taxation is too low to finance
basic services and to elevate the nation from
recession.1
* The national debt: Some consider this issue
to be one of the greatest moral crises of our
age, while others disparage this view as a
trumped-up issue designed to gut social
services. "
* The right to bear arms: Some see in this
right the very foundation of free
government, while others view an expansive
protection of the right as a threat to civil
liberty and, in innumerable cases, to life
itself.'"
These divisions over policy aside, there exist other,
deeper tendencies that may well corrode the values and
institutions that underwrite constitutional government.
Consider, for example, a nation for which war has become a
way of life and national security a supreme value.19 Consider
15. See generally Janet L. Dolgin, New Terms for an Old Debate: Embryos,
Dying, and the "Culture Wars", 6 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 249, 251-60 (2006)
(summarizing the history of the abortion debate in the United States).
16. See generally Susannah Camic Tahk, Making Impossible Tax Reform
Possible, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2683, 2683-95 (2013) (discussing the federal tax-
reform debate).
17. This debate over fiscal policy culminated most recently in an October 2013
shutdown of the United States federal government after Congress failed to raise the
debt ceiling amid partisan disagreement over funding of President Obama's
healthcare reform law. Jake Sherman et al., Government Shutdown: Congress
Sputters on CR, POLITICO (Sept. 30, 2013, 10:03 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/house-senate-government-shutdown-
97557.html.
18. See generally Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 90-93
(2013) (discussing modern American gun culture).
19. See Cheryl Pellerin, Military Essential in U.S. Foreign Policy Future, Hagel
Says, U.S. DEP'T DEF. (Nov. 5, 2013),
http://www.defense.gov/News/newsarticle.aspx?ID=121057. See generally Mark E.
Brandon, War and American Constitutional Order, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1815 (2004)
(showing the constitutional consequences of the practice of war as a way of life).
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also a distribution of wealth that is so grossly disparate that
republican institutions have been supplanted by an
oligarchic government in the service of a plutocratic class. 2 0
Consider finally a political class that is unwilling or unable to
enact national policy, even when a substantial majority of
people agree that the policy is desirable.21
At a higher level of abstraction, the contemporary
American polity suffers from three incapacitating
conditions: (1) a dissipated sense of common purpose; (2) a
loss of civic trust; and (3) a genuinely dysfunctional national
government. Professor Levinson is concerned mainly about
the third condition, but he is not oblivious to the first two.
Still, the mere presence of problems-even problems
that are deep and enduring-does not necessarily mean that
nullification or secession is an efficacious or desirable
solution. Nor do such problems mean that nullification or
secession is a permissible solution. The following sections
address the last of these questions: Are nullification and
secession permissible? I will approach this question not from
the perch of moral philosophy or from the perspective of
international law, but as a question of constitutional law,
history, and theory.
III. NULLIFICATION
In assessing the constitutionality of nullification-
whether as interposition or as a system of concurrent
majorities-we should begin with the first "constitution" of
the United States: the Articles of Confederation. The
Articles were authorized by "the Delegates of the . . .
States" 22 and were expressly styled as a confederacy and a
"league of friendship, "23 in which "[e]ach State retain[ed] its
20. See G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, UNIV. CAL. SANTA
CRUZ, http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html?print (last
updated Feb. 2013).
21. For example, a June 2013 Gallup Poll indicated that seventy-eight percent
of Americans disapprove of the way Congress is performing its job -primarily due to
partisan gridlock in Washington. Lydia Saad, Gridlock Is Top Reason Americans Are
Critical of Congress, GALLUP (June 12, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163031/gridlock-top-reason-americans-critical-
congress.aspx.
22. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, pmbl.
23. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III, para. 1.
2014] 95
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sovereignty, freedom and independence." 24  The Articles
required a supermajority of nine votes (roughly two-thirds)
to enact policy. 25 They denied to Congress even basic powers
to tax or to regulate commerce. 26 The Articles also omitted
a national executive for enforcing national policy 27 and
allowed for only a thin and feeble federal judiciary. 28 As
James Madison suggested, the Articles were, in form and
function, a treaty among states-not a constitution.2 9
Compare the Articles with the text that calls itself the
Constitution of the United States. The "People" of the
United States authorized the Constitution.3 0 It was styled
expressly as a constitution that aimed at ambitious purposes
and claimed to be the supreme law of the land.31 The
Constitution provided not only for a national legislature but
also for a national executive and judiciary.3 2 It delegated to
those three institutions substantial powers, the exercise of
which was not subject to the permission of the states.3 3 The
Constitution further provided that Congress could enact
policy through a simple majority of each house, subject to a
possible veto by the executive.3 4 It also bound state judges
to the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the nation.35
Consider the arguments offered for ratifying the
Constitution. Alexander Hamilton, for example, criticized
the weakness and "imbecility" of the national government
under the Articles of Confederation.3 6 He observed that it
was incapable of enacting and enforcing policy even within
24. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II, para. 1.
25. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 2, art. X, para. 1.
26. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781.
27. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781.
28. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1-2.
29. JAMES MADISON, VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED
STATES (Apr. 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 351 (Robert A. Rutland
& William M.E. Rachal eds., 1975) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS], available at
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/makingrev/constitution/textl/madisonvices.
pdf.
30. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I III.
33. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
35. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.




its borders.3 7 Moreover, he characterized the government as
feeble and embarrassing in its relations with other nations.38
Even if one recognizes an implied and later explicit
reservation of powers in the several states,3 9 it is impossible
to imagine that nullification was constitutionally permissible,
even in the earliest years of the republic (well before the
Fourteenth Amendment), when states continued to exercise
expansive authority.4 0 This conclusion does not rest on the
fact that Andrew Jackson controlled the most guns in 1828
or 1832. Rather, nullification is constitutionally
impermissible because it rests on an implausible
understanding of the Constitution, the institutional structure
it created, and the purposes for which it was ratified. The
Constitution did provide for concurrent majorities to create
policy-involving the House of Representatives, the Senate,
and the President41 -but this system had nothing to do with
empowering states to countermand a policy of the nation.
Such a countermanding power was precisely one of the
perceived defects of the Articles of Confederation and, thus,
was one of the reasons for creating an invigorated national
power under the Constitution.4 2
However, this underlying rationale for creating the
Constitution does not mean that all was nationalism in the
constitutional order, or that states were mere political
subdivisions of the nation -even after the Civil War and the
Fourteenth Amendment. But as a constitutional device,
state-based nullification was buried in 1789. The
reappearance of nullification in our own time may be good
or bad, but it is not constitutional-at least not under the
current Constitution.
37. See id. at 106-07.
38. Id.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively . . . .").
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (limiting the actions of state and local
officials, as well as the actions of individuals acting on behalf of those officials).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
42. See MADISON PAPERS, supra note 29.
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IV. SECESSION
Secession is different.43 Today, several types of
justification for secession exist, and Professor Levinson
alludes to most of them: (1) moral theory (proposed, for
example, by Allen Buchanan); 44 (2) international law (by
Diane Orentlicher and others); 45 (3) economics (by James
Buchanan); 46 and (4) geo-politics (by Akhil Reed Amar, who
deploys geo-strategic concerns to argue against a right of
secession, at least in the United States). 47  There is also a
simple, pragmatic argument for secession: that when a
society fractures deeply, and when the fracture is enduring,
and when the fracture aggregates along geographical lines,
and when the aggregated differences create long-term moral,
economic, or political stresses, secession can be a plausible
solution to those stresses.
I do not want to discount any of these approaches. But
I am interested in a slightly different question-and maybe
one that is closer to home: Is secession ever justifiable
constitutionally? If so, why and how? In the United States,
the question hits three immediate roadblocks. First, did not
the Civil War decide this question? 48 Answer: The Civil War
43. See generally MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN
SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 170 (1998) (reasoning that secession was
arguably permissible under either the federalists or the antifederalists' theory for
America's foundation).
44. Allen Buchanan, Federalism, Secession, and the Morality of Inclusion, 37
ARIz. L. REV. 53, 58 (1995) (positing that, according to one major moral outlook,
"individuals are free to choose those with whom they will form a political
association").
45. Diane F. Orentlicher, Separatism and the Democratic Entitlement, 92 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. 131, 132 (1998) ("[I]nternational law no longer abides colonization or
forcible annexation.").
46. James M. Buchanan, An American Perspective on Europe's Constitutional
Opportunity, 10 CATO J. 619, 620 (1991) ("The potentiality of a viable secessionist
threat could emerge only if the central government . . . should take action that
differentially damages citizens of the separate state or regions within its territory.").
47. Akhil Reed Amar, The David C. Baum Lecture: Abraham Lincoln and the
American Union, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1109, 1130 (explaining that secessionist states
during the Civil War "had no right to take the land with them, or to try to bind their
pro-Union neighbors").
48. See, e.g., Kristen Svoboda, Comment, No Success in Secession: 135 Years
Ago the United States ofAmerica Experienced Civil War, Now Canada Grapples with
the Possible Secession of Quebec, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 747, 748 (2000) ("Past
generations of Americans fought the Civil War to prove that the South had no right
to end the Union based on territorial differences.").
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did decide the secessions of 1861 as a matter of raw force; but
it did not-it could not-decide secession as a matter of
constitutional authority. Second, did not the Supreme Court
decide the question in Texas v. White?49 It did not. For the
decision in White is so riddled with contradiction-the South
left the Union, the South never left the Uniono0-that it is an
unreliable foundation for any coherent principle of whether
secession is constitutionally justifiable. Third, the Supreme
Court aside, perhaps Abraham Lincoln had a point when he
argued that the Union was perpetual-and secession, being
incompatible with perpetuity, is simply unconstitutional.s"
This position is more interesting. But there are two
problems with the claim to perpetuity. One is empirical. The
other is grounded in constitutional authority.
The empirical problem is simply that perpetuity is an
illusion or a delusion. As an empirical matter, political
regimes fall apart.5 2 Nations are born. They die. The sun
also rises. Any regime that believes it is perpetual believes
in ghosts.
The problem of constitutional authority is more
complicated. It starts with this insight: Every political
system that claims to be constitutional must justify its
existence.53 It is not sufficient to say that the regime has
power. The question is whether the regime also has
authority. Simply declaring that authority comes from a
constitution is also insufficient. For the constitution, too,
must be justified.54 One day a constitution does not exist.
The next day it does. Why follow it? Why pay attention to
it at all?
49. See 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 726 (1868) (holding that "Texas continued to be a
State, and a State of the Union, notwithstanding [the South's attempt at secession]").
50. See id. at 705, 726.
51. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, in
CIVIL WAR 150: READER #2: RECKONING WITH THE WAR 33 (2012), available at
http://www.gilderlehrman.org/sites/all/themes/gli/panels/civilwar150/Civil %20War%
20reader%202.pdf.
52. See generally THE HISTORIANS' HISTORY OF THE WORLD (Henry Smith
Williams et al. eds., 1904) (depicting the rise and fall of several historical civilizations).
53. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION 116 (2003)
("[U]ltimate public acceptance is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of any




One possible answer is that the constitution is good and
true and right-the best conception of political morality that
one can implement for now.ss I do not want to denigrate this
claim, but we can take it only so far with respect to the
Constitution of the United States. For one thing, the
constitutional text was riddled with pragmatic compromise.5 6
Compromise, in and of itself, is not necessarily bad, but it
usually does not present a robust substantive vision of the
good life." For another thing, there is the problem of
slavery. The unfortunate truth is that one point of the
Constitution was to maintain a slaveholding republic." That
fact is a problem for any moral justification for the
Constitution's authority.
Thus, if the Constitution can claim authority, it comes
not strictly from the position of goodness, truth, and right,
but from a different place. Typically, that place is the story
of how the Constitution came to be. In the American
experience, at least three strands of the founding story
reinforce a "right" of secession.
The first strand involves the Declaration of
Independence and the American Revolution. As Professor
Levinson mentions, the American Revolution was not a
"revolution" at all.59 Rather, it was a war of secession.6 0 In
this way, secession became a basic part of the original DNA
of the American order.61
Second, the mode for ratifying the Constitution was
structured, potentially at least, as a kind of secession.
According to Article VII, an affirmative vote of conventions
55. See id. at 116-17.
56. See generally CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA:
THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1966) (depicting the many
"debates" and "compromises" that led to the birth of the Constitution).
57. Steve Inskeep & Shankar Vedantam, Why Compromise Is a Bad Word in
Politics, NPR (Mar. 13, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/13/148499310/
why-compromise-is-terrible-politics (discussing the perception of political
compromise in American culture).
58. BOWEN, supra note 56, at 204.
59. Sanford Levinson, The Twenty-First Century Rediscovery of Nullification
and Secession in American Political Rhetoric: Frivolousness Incarnate or Serious
Arguments to Be Wrestled With?, 67 ARK. L. REV. 17, 49 & n.177 (2014).
60. Id. ("Had American Indians led the American Revolution, I would not be
inclined to describe that as 'secession."').
61. See id. at 49 n.177.
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in nine states ratified the Constitution "between the States
so ratifying the Same."62 In short, once nine states ratified,
they had technically seceded from the antecedent
confederation to form a new constitutional union.63 The
remaining four states were on their own, either to continue
the confederation or to become separate sovereign entities.6 4
Eventually, of course, all thirteen states joined the new
union. But their non-acquiescence would not have
changed-in fact it would have underscored-the
secessionist character of the new Constitution.
The third strand reinforcing a right of secession involves
"the People" as the ultimate source of political authority in
the American order -as the authorizers (if not the authors)
of the Constitution. The premise of this strand is this: If the
people can make the Constitution, they may unmake, or de-
authorize, the Constitution;6 5 and they may do so by
imitating the method they used for making the constitutional
order or for ratifying the Constitution in the first place.6 6 The
existing constitutional order cannot deny the people this
authority without undermining the very authority of the
Constitution itself.6 7
If my analysis of these three strands is correct, then the
only question is not whether, but how, secession may
proceed-by the unilateral action of seceding states or by
some mechanism that reflects or represents the consent of
the whole? In either case, there would likely be a negotiated
settlement concerning the status of persons and the
ownership or control of property. And in either case, the
62. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
63. See THE CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION, at XXIII (Kenneth R. Thomas & Larry M. Eig eds., Centennial
ed. 2013), available at http://beta.congress.gov/content/conan/pdf/GPO-CONAN-
2013.pdf.
64. See id.
65. While the topic of secession remains as contentious as ever, the more general
notion of public participation in policymaking is becoming relatively standard. For
example, on September 22, 2011, President Obama launched an online petitioning
system by which the government guarantees an official response from expert
policymakers for any petition that receives the requisite amount of signatures. We the
People: Your Voice in Our Government, WHITE HOUSE,
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
66. See id.
67. BARBER, supra note 53, at 116-17.
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argument would be over methodological or procedural
details, not over the constitutionality of the separation itself.
